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Abstract
Wages may be observed to increase with seniority because of ¯rm-speci¯c hu-
man capital accumulation or because of self-selection of better workers in longer
jobs. In both these cases the upward sloping wage pro¯le in cross sectional regres-
sions would re°ect higher productivity of more senior workers. If this were true,
the observation of an e®ect of seniority on wages would depend on the presence
of controls for individual productivity. In this paper we replicate, using person-
nel data from a large Italian ¯rm, the results of the pioneering work of Medo®
and Abraham (1980 and 1981) in which supervisors' evaluations were used as pro-
ductivity indicators. Since the validity of supervisors' evaluations as measures of
productivity has been widely criticised, we extend the work of Medo® and Abraham
using di®erent direct measures of productivity based on recorded absenteeism and
misconduct episodes. Both these indicators and supervisors' evaluation suggest
that the observed e®ect of seniority on wages does not re°ect a higher productiv-
ity of more senior workers. Theories in which wages are deferred for incentive or
insurance reasons are therefore more likely to explain the observed upward sloping
pro¯le.
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1 Introduction
In a recent evaluation of the existing literature on incentives and careers in organizations,
Robert Gibbons (1996) invited empirical researchers to \provide evidence on a core set
of questions before studying speciflc issues of their own." Two of these questions ask
whether \wage increases and promotions are more likely with higher performance evalu-
ations" and whether \the efiect of seniority on wages (is) independent of the presence of
controls for performance evaluation." The justiflcation for these questions comes from
the fact that most of what we know on the relationship between supervisors’ evaluations,
seniority, promotions and wages comes from two quite in°uential but old papers by Med-
ofi and Abraham (1980 and 1981; MA hereafter) whose results, albeit widely quoted and
discussed, have almost never been replicated and verifled with difierent datasets.
The wide interest for the pioneering work of MA is motivated by the fact that
their evidence is not only relevant for industrial psychologists willing to understand the
nature and role of supervisors’ evaluations. Perhaps more importantly, their evidence is
aimed at ofiering a test of great interest for labor economists: a test of whether a positive
efiect of seniority on wages re°ects an increase in productivity due to flrm-speciflc human
capital investment or not.1
In MA’s work the basis for this test is the assumption that job performance ratings
made by immediate supervisors are valid indicators of the relative current productiv-
ity of workers. Under this assumption, if the efiect of seniority on wages were due to
productivity, it should disappear after controlling for supervisors’ evaluations. Further-
more, if more seniority increases the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution
of wages it should also increase the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of
job performance indicators. Their flnding is instead that the efiect of seniority on wages
is essentially independent from the presence of controls for supervisors’ evaluations and
that while higher seniority pushes workers up in the distribution of wages within levels it
does not increase the worker’s ranking in the distribution of performance ratings. They
therefore conclude that the human capital theory cannot explain the efiect of seniority
on wages and that this efiect must have difierent explanations.
The most prominent of the alternative explanations proposed in the literature is
based on the idea that a positive correlation between seniority and wages is required by
implicit employment contracts aimed at creating the proper incentives to exert efiort,
as for example suggested by Lazear (1979 and 1981). A similar positive correlation may
also be generated by contracts aimed at protecting risk averse workers from wage changes
induced by °uctuations in perceived productivity, as in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) or
by sorting mechanisms as in Jovanovic (1979).2
Another potentially more disruptive possibility, that received wide attention in the
last decade, is that the observed positive correlation in OLS regressions is just an artifact
of the data. Abraham and Farber (1987) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987) suggest, for
example, that omitted variables representing the worker, the job or the worker-employer
1See for example Becker (1964), Mincer (1974), Mortensen (1978), Mincer and Jovanovic (1981)
Brown (1989) and more recently Mincer (1997).
2For recent re-evaluations of this literature, see Carmichael (1989) and Hutchens (1989).
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match might be positively correlated with lower quit rates and higher productivity.
Therefore, the observed positive correlation between seniority and wages would be spu-
rious and driven by these unobserved confounding factors. Both these papers reach the
conclusion that earnings in fact do not rise very much with seniority. More recently,
Topel (1991) has challenged this conclusion arguing that the two papers who propose it
use inappropriate methods and/or data. On the contrary, Altonji and Williams (1997)
defend and conflrm the conclusion on the basis of a careful re-examination of the entire
evidence.
For some scholars, the empirical question of whether wages do actually increase
with seniority remains still open, as recently stated by Felli and Harris (1996). But,
even if one were willing to accept the conservative estimates of Abraham and Farber
(1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Altonjii and Williams (1997), the true efiect
of seniority on wages would nevertheless be approximately equal to 11% per ten years.3
Even if this efiect is small, it is not insigniflcant, and one would still like to know if it
re°ects an increase in productivity or other causes. Furthermore, even if flrm-speciflc
human capital investment were irrelevant and self selection of more productive workers
in longer jobs were the explanation of the OLS crossectional estimates, controls for
individual productivity should still be expected to reduce this efiect. For these reasons,
we believe that a replication and veriflcation of the MA results using difierent data is
still useful and informative twenty years later.
To be more precise the goal of our paper in not only to check whether MA’s re-
sults can be replicated, but also to improve and extend their testing procedure using
alternative direct indicators of individual productivity. As already mentioned above, the
validity of their conclusions is based on an assumption that has been widely criticized
in the literature: namely that supervisors’ evaluations are a good measure of individual
productivity. In their papers, MA anticipate this criticism answering several possible
objections and strenuously defending their assumption. But the possibility that supervi-
sors’ evaluations have little to do with individual productivity remains a potential weak
point of their approach.
We think that nothing can be added to what has been already written and said
in defense or against this assumption. What is instead needed is the use of other and
direct measures of individual productivity in order to check whether the results obtained
by MA with supervisors’ evaluations continue to hold.
Our proposed additional measures of current relative productivity are indicators
of absenteeism and reported misconduct episodes that can be constructed with the de-
tailed and exhaustive information contained in our dataset. The justiflcation for these
measures is intuitive. Workers who are more often and for longer periods absent are
less productive for the flrm, whether or not their absenteeism is motivated by shirking
or true bad health. Furthermore, inasmuch as the accumulation of flrm speciflc human
capital has to take place on the job, absenteeism must reduce such accumulation. For
misconduct episodes, a higher frequency and gravity of misbehaviour recorded by the
personnel o–ce indicates lower productivity precisely from the point of view of what the
personnel o–ce considers as harmful for the flrm. Neither absenteeism nor misconduct
3 This is the preferred estimate of Altonjii and Williams (1997) while the Topel (1991) estimate is
approximately 24% and the standard OLS estimates are in the order of 35%.
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episodes fully measure productivity, but they certainly represent two important compo-
nents of this multidimensional concept. It seems, therefore, likely that they should be
positively correlated to the employee’s true current worth for the flrm. Note also that
being measures of individual productivity or efiort they are largely independent from
aggregate shocks afiecting the flrm. We therefore believe that they provide interesting
measures of productivity on which to check the robustness of MA’s conclusions.
Our results are unambiguous: all our performance indicators do not have any
efiect on the seniority-wage proflle and while tenure increases the worker’s ranking in
the distribution of wages, it actually reduces his/her ranking in the distribution of these
performance indicators. Of course, the combination of ours and MA’s results could
still not disprove the possibility that the efiect of seniority on wages re°ects higher
productivity of more senior workers. Suppose that productivity were the sum of two
uncorrelated components: for example, good conduct and knowledge. If only the second
grew with seniority our measures of good conduct would still leave the efiect of seniority
on wages unchanged. This (untestable) assumption notwithstanding, we believe that our
results cast strong doubts on the hypothesis that productivity is the factor behind the
growth of wages with seniority.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data; section 3 replicates
on our Italian sample the testing procedure proposed by MA; section 4 extends the
original procedure using our alternative indicators of performance. Section 5 discusses
possible alternative interpretations of the evidence and the conclusions that can be drawn
upon it.
2 Data and Productivity Measures
The flrm studied in this paper is a large bank with branches in every province of the
Italian territory. From the personnel department of this bank we received several flles
containing, for difierent aspects of the employment relationship, information on all the
relevant events characterizing the history of each employee of the bank. In particular
the flles contain information on: 1) employee’s characteristics independent of time at
the flrm, like date and region of birth, education (level, type and grade) and previous
working experience; 2) compensation levels and individual or collective wage increases
and bonuses; 3) careers, promotions, job description and turnover between branches; 4)
union membership and union leadership position; 5) family loads; 6) supervisors’ evalu-
ations; 7) reason and duration of absence and late arrival episodes; 8) merit, disciplinary
measures and dismissals on disciplinary ground.
The information contained in these original flles has been reorganized for the anal-
ysis into a panel data set with one observation per year for each worker on payroll in the
month of November of each year between 1974 and 1994.4 To make our results compa-
rable with the cross-sectional evidence of MA we concentrate on the sample of workers
observed in the last of these years; but to construct some of our alternative productivity
measures we also use the retrospective information ofiered by the panel structure of the
4See Ichino and Ichino (1997) for more details on this dataset.
3
data.5 For the same comparability, reason we limit the analysis to the male workforce.
A potentially disturbing but unavoidable difierence with respect to the samples
considered by MA is instead represented by the fact that we received information on
supervisors’ evaluations only for non-managerial workers, while MA data include also
employees in managerial jobs. This difierence may make the comparability between ours
and MA’s results less informative but it does not seem to be in anyway essential for the
testing procedure or for the interpretation of our results.
Our flnal sample contains data on 10817 male employees on payroll during the
month of November of 1994. Descriptive statistics on this sample are given in table 1.
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the Company A sample described by MA.
In their papers, they use data taken from three companies (A, B and C) obtaining similar
results for each of them. In our paper, we decided to report, for comparison purposes,
the results concerning company A because this is the company with the number of
observations and the supervisors’ evaluation system more similar to those of our bank.
Only in the case of the auxiliary evidence presented in tables 3 and 4 we compare our
bank with MA’s Company B because MA do not present that type of evidence for their
Company A.
Both our and MA earnings are measured before taxes but at the annual frequency
in the MA flrm and at the monthly frequency in our flrm. As in the MA’s paper, we
measure education with the highest school degree attained by the worker.6 For workers in
both flrms, pre-company experience was calculated as the difierence between potential
working experience (computed on the basis of age and educational attainment) and
seniority. Current seniority is based on the precise date in which workers took service in
the flrms.
Hierarchical levels for our bank were constructed following the methodology de-
scribed in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994). The idea of this procedure is to identify
the relevant levels in the flrm’s hierarchy by looking at the actual paths followed with
greatest frequency by workers in their careers. Beginning with the flrst level, deflned
as the set of positions in which workers are more frequently hired (the port of entry),
higher levels are sequentially identifled as those positions through which workers more
frequently transit in a typical career. The result has been a scale of 8 grade levels for
the non-managerial employees on which this paper is focused. The distribution of work-
ers across these levels is given in table 1. Finally, table 1 describes also the regional
distribution of workers in our sample.
The supervisors’ evaluations system at our bank is very similar to the system that
characterizes MA’s flrm A. Supervisors receive detailed instructions on how to rank their
subordinates using a four-level scale. These instructions are analogous to those described
by MA and involve four possible choices labelled as low, medium, good and very good.
Table 2 shows for Italy a strong concentration of employees in the higher evaluation
ranks: only 2.4% of the Italian workforce is classifled in the lowest performance group,
5Anyway, in our dataset, supervisors' evaluations are unfortunately available only for the period
1989-94. There is no evidence that the year 1994 is di®erent from the previous years of this short period
from the point of view of the issues discussed in this paper.
6Post-Laurea (post-college) degrees have been introduced very recently in the Italian education sys-
tem and are irrevant in the sample considered in this paper.
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while almost half of it is in the highest. Evaluation ratings are, however, more evenly dis-
tributed than in MA’s company, where 74% of the workforce is concentrated in the third
level. These are typical characteristic of subjective evaluation systems and have been
used in the literature to argue that they cannot ofier reliable measures of relative produc-
tivity because the lumping in the top category hides relevant productivity difierentials.
Evaluations have also been criticized as measures of productivity because supervisors are
unlikely to follow uniform criteria and because irrelevant worker’s characteristics might
instead in°uence the criteria of supervisors.
If these problems exist they are certainly shared also by the system of supervisors’
evaluations in use at our bank, although in this flrm the more even distribution of
ratings makes them somewhat less worrisome. We have nothing to add to the defense
proposed by MA in their papers7, but we believe that the most important contribution
of MA does not live or die with the reliability of supervisors’ evaluations as measures of
productivity. The crucial value added of their paper consists in the identiflcation of a
procedure to test whether the efiect of seniority on wages re°ects higher productivity of
more senior workers. This procedure, originally applied using supervisors’ evaluations
as measures of productivity, needs now to be applied using difierent and more direct
measures. Therefore, since our data ofier this possibility, our goal is not only to show
that MA’s conclusions can be replicated in our flrm but also and more importantly to
show that they are robust with respect to other productivity indicators.
We construct these alternative indicators from the detailed information that our
data set contains on the episodes of employee’s absenteeism and misbehaviour recorded
by the Personnel O–ce of our bank. As far as absenteeism is concerned, the variables that
we use are constructed on the basis of the number of absence episodes per year of tenure
that were due to illness and that lasted for more than 15 days.8 Worker’s misbehavior is
instead measured on the basis of the number of episodes recorded and punished by the
personnel o–ce according to the procedure established by collective bargaining and by
the Statuto dei Lavoratori.9 These episodes involve unjustifled absence and late arrivals,
actions taken by the worker outside the relationship with the bank, but potentially
relevant for the latter (e.g. fraud, theft etc.), violations of the internal regulations of
the bank (e.g. omitted controls on checks, credit to unreliable customers, etc.) and
inappropriate behaviour inside the workplace (e.g. sexual harassment, violence, insults,
etc.). Possible punishments are chosen from a grid of sanctions established in collective
bargaining that go from verbal reproaches to flring. Descriptive statistics concerning our
additional performance indicators based on absenteeism and misconduct episodes are
contained in table 2
To anticipate possible critiques concerning the irrelevance of supervisors’ evalua-
tions as productivity indicators, MA show that these evaluations are important predictors
of the probability that a worker is promoted and of the size of wage increases. In table
3 and 4 we show that the same happens in our Italian bank. In both tables, column 1
7See also Bishop (1987).
8Shorter absence episodes are not recorded by the Personnel O±ce. We tried also the average
duration of episodes but it did not prove relevant. Also Ichino and Ichino (1997) shows that the action
in terms of absenteeism comes more from the frequency of episodes than from their duration. A careful
examination of absenteeism in this ¯rm is on our future research agenda.
9The Statuto dei Lavoratori is the chart of workers' rights that regulates the most crucial aspects of
Italian industrial relations.
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report the MA’s estimates while columns 2 reports the analogous estimates for our flrm.
In both flrms, and in particular in the Italian one, controlling for individual characteris-
tics and hierarchical levels, employees receiving better evaluations are more likely to be
promoted and receive higher percentage wage increases. The probability of promotion
is estimated using a Logit model while an OLS regression is used to predict percentage
wage increases.
In columns 3 and 4 of the same tables we show that also our alternative indica-
tors of productivity, based on absenteeism and misbehaviour, are important predictors
of promotions (table 3) and wage increases (table 4). Controlling for individual charac-
teristics and hierarchical levels, employees who are less frequently involved in absence
or misconduct episodes are more likely to be promoted and receive larger percent wage
increases.
Note that for supervisors’ evaluations one could argue that in these regressions
causality goes in the opposite way in the sense that better evaluations are granted to
justify promotions and wage increases that are previously decided on difierent grounds.
In this case, higher evaluations would just be the bureaucratic consequence of the decision
to promote or to give a wage increase. It seems instead di–cult to claim that the same
reverse link of causation occurs for our alternative indicators of productivity. Therefore,
extending MA’s procedure on the basis of measures of absenteeism or misbehaviour seems
important for this reason as well. But before presenting the results of this extension, we
want to show, in the next section, that MA’s evidence based on supervisors’ evaluations
is replicated in our flrm.
3 Replication: The Efiect of Supervisor’s Evalua-
tions
MA’s empirical analysis is based on two distinct steps. The flrst one consists in the
estimation of ln(earning) functions with or without controls for supervisors’ evaluations.
In these regressions they flnd that the coe–cient of seniority remains the same inde-
pendently of the presence or absence of these controls. The second step is based on
a multinomial logit analysis aimed at establishing if workers who rank higher in the
distribution of earnings because of seniority, have also, for the same reason, a higher
ranking in the distribution of performance evaluations. In this analysis they flnd that
while higher seniority pushes workers up in the distribution of earnings it tends to lower
their position in the distribution of evaluations. In this section we replicate these two
steps to check whether MA’s results are conflrmed in our flrm.
3.1 Earning Functions
Table 5 reports comparable estimates of ln(pre-tax earning) functions based on our flrm
and on MA’s Company A.10 The models in columns 1 and 4 are based on the standard
10As already mentioned, for comparison porposes we report here the results for MA's Company A
because its evaluation system is more similar to the one in use at our bank.
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human capital speciflcation of these regressions. The flrst set of regressors are dummies
for schooling levels. Until very recently, the Italian education system did not ofier master
and doctorate degrees and, therefore, dummies for these degrees are not available in the
Italian sample. The comparison concerning the other educational coe–cients shows that,
holding labor market experience constant, returns to education are substantially lower in
Italy.11 With respect to college degree holders (the omitted category in both samples),
Italian employees experience an income loss of 18% if they have less than a highschool
diploma, while similarly educated US workers lose 25%. Holding just the highschool
diploma implies a loss of 5% in Italy and of 13% in the US.
The next set of regressors captures the efiect of total labor market experience
distinguishing between time potentially spent with previous employers and seniority
in the current flrm. Both these efiects are captured by linear and quadratic terms.
Potential previous experience has basically no efiect on current wages in the Italian
sample. Probably because of high flring costs in Italian large service flrms12, employees
at our bank are usually hired very soon after leaving schools and careers take place within
the flrm as in the Internal Labor Market paradigm.13 In this way the flrm can minimize
the cost of having to keep on payroll workers that after hiring prove undesirable but
too costly to flre. As a result, seniority represents more than 80% of total labor market
experience for more than 50% of the workforce. We therefore believe that, as far as
labor market experience is concerned, the comparison between our’s and MA’s results is
probably interesting and meaningful only for the efiect of seniority.
As far as seniority is concerned, 10 years of company service increase wages more
in the Italian flrm than in the US flrm but the efiects are similar. At ten years of
seniority, ten more years of seniority increase wages by approximately 19% in Italy and
by approximately 14% in the U.S.14 Therefore, in both flrms more senior workers are
observed to earn substantially higher wages and the question addressed by MA is whether
this efiect has to be attributed to productivity or to other reasons.
Since supervisors’ evaluations can be interpreted as indicators of relative produc-
tivity only within hierarchical levels, MA’s next step consists in estimating how much
of the efiects of education and experience remains holding hierarchical levels constant.
Their results are presented in column 5 while the comparable Italian results are in col-
umn 2. In both countries most of the loss due to holding less than a highschool diploma
instead of a college degree comes from assignment to levels with lower mean earnings.
For highschool graduates, instead, the loss takes place within grade levels in Italy, but
between grade levels in the US.
Coming to seniority, a signiflcant and similar efiect of company service remains in
11This result complements in an important way the comparative evidence o®ered by Erickson and
Ichino (1994) because it shows that their ¯nding of lower educational returns in Italy are not a conse-
quence of the use of after tax earnings. In that paper, in fact only after{tax earnings were available for
Italy (compared to pre{tax earnings for the US), while here the comparisons concerns pre-tax earnings
in both countries.
12See Ichino, Ichino and Polo, (1997).
13see Doeringer and Piore (1971).
14Note that, following MA, these estimates are based on a quadratic speci¯cation of the e®ect of
tenure on wages and therefore are not directly comparable with the linear estimates generally found in
the literature that we report in footnote 3.
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both countries also after controlling for hierarchical levels: 44% of the return from one
additional year of seniority occurs within grade level in the MA flrm while 47% is the
analogous flgure for our bank.
If this within-level efiect of seniority on wages were due to higher productivity of
more senior workers, the introduction of productivity indicators should eliminate or at
least reduce it. However, columns 3 and 6 show that the introduction of dummies for
supervisors’ evaluations leave the coe–cients on seniority, as well as those on education,
basically unchanged. MA interpret this result as evidence that \performance does not
appear to be a mediating factor in the within-grade level positive relationship between
either education or labor force experience and earnings".
3.2 Multinomial Logit Results
The second step of the MA’s analysis is aimed at establishing whether seniority raises
the employee’s ranking not only in the distribution of wages but also in the distribution
of performance evaluations. Following the MA’s procedure, given the small fraction of
workers who got the lowest rating, we flrst grouped together the two bottom evaluation
levels 1 and 2. In this way we obtained three evaluation categories re-labelled respectively
as low, medium and high.
We then created a trivariate categorization of within-level wages (low, medium,
high) in the following way. Consider for example the flrst hierarchical level in which 10%
of the workers receive a low evaluation, 50% receive a medium evaluation and 30% a high
evaluation. Given these quantiles, we classifled in the low wage category those workers
in level 1 who were in the bottom 10% of their within-level wage distribution; in the high
wage category those who were in the top 30% and in the medium wage category those
who were in the intermediate 50% group. We then repeated the same procedure for each
of the 8 hierarchical levels. In this way we obtained a trivariate classiflcation for both
performance and wages and each worker was assigned to a wage and to a performance
category. If workers with higher wages have also higher performance evaluations, the
two classiflcations should match perfectly. Indeed, the match is quite good although
not perfect as shown by the fact that the correlation between the two classiflcations is
0.37. But the crucial question that these two classiflcations raise is whether the efiect of
seniority on assignments is the same in both. This question is relevant because if more
senior workers were also more productive, higher seniority should increase not only the
probability of an assignment to a higher wage category but also the probability of an
assignment to a higher evaluation category.
Table 6 reports, for the two flrms, multinomial logit estimates of the probability of
assignment to the evaluation and wage categories. Looking flrst at the MA’s results in
columns 5, 6, 7, and 8, education, previous experience and seniority increase the prob-
ability of assignment to the two higher wage categories but reduce or leaves unchanged
the probability of assignment to the two higher evaluation categories.
In the Italian flrm, disregarding previous experience for the reasons outlined above,
education and seniority have again difierent efiects on the employees’ position in the two
classiflcations. Higher education increases the probability of assignment to the higher
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wage categories but reduces or leaves unchanged the probability of higher performance
evaluations. As far as company service is concerned, the Italian flrm does not feature op-
posite efiects of seniority on wages and evaluations, but the coe–cients remains markedly
difierent in addition to being higher than in the US flrm. Seniority increases signiflcantly
the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of wages but much less, in relative
terms, the probability of a higher ranking in the distribution of performance evaluations.
The fact that both the earning function and the multinomial logit analysis for our
flrm conflrm MA’s results, strengthen the conclusion that the efiect of seniority on wages
does not re°ect higher productivity of more senior workers. MA’s result are not due to
a peculiarity of their flrm but can be replicated in a difierent flrm, in difierent years and
in a country characterized by very difierent labor market institutions.
However, the evidence presented in this section for the Italian flrm shares with the
MA’s evidence the critique concerning the use of supervisors’ evaluation. Therefore, in
the next section we adapt the testing procedure proposed by MA to alternative direct
measures of workers individual productivity.
4 Extension: Absenteeism and Misbehaviour
The alternative productivity indicators on which our analysis is based are constructed in
the way described in section 2 from the detailed information that our data set contains on
the episodes of employee’s absenteeism and misbehaviour recorded by the personnel o–ce
of our bank. As in the previous section we examine flrst the evidence based on earning
functions. Then we move to the evidence based on the assignment to productivity and
wage categories, that, given the characteristics of our productivity indicators, will take
the form of a simple logit analysis.
4.1 Earning Functions with Alternative Productivity Measures
Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of earning functions. For the reader’s conve-
nience, the flrst column reproduces the estimates of the basic human capital speciflcation
(augmented with hierarchical levels) presented in column 2 of table 5. Columns 2, 3 and
4 show how instead these estimates are modifled by the introduction of our alternative
productivity indicators, separately or together. In each speciflcation the productivity
measures are highly signiflcant, but they leave the coe–cient of the education and expe-
rience variables practically unchanged.
If anything, absenteeism appears to have a marginally greater negative efiect on the
seniority coe–cient, but the overall picture coming out of this table basically conflrms
the results of section 3.1: more senior workers do not seem to earn more because they are
more productive, at least as far as absenteeism and misconduct episodes are measures
of productivity.
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4.2 Logit Analysis with Alternative Productivity Measures
In order to adapt the MA’s multinomial logit analysis to our productivity indicators we
proceed as follows. In the case of misconduct episodes, the high productivity category is
deflned by the group of employees who were never reported for misconduct during their
company service. Given the proportion of workers in this status for each hierarchical
level, the same fraction of workers in the highest tail of the distribution of wages of each
level was assigned to the high wage category. In the case of absenteeism we created a
bivariate classiflcation in which the high productivity category is deflned by the group
of employees who were never sick and absent from work for more than 15 days. The
corresponding high wage category is therefore constituted by those employees who were
found in the highest correspondent percentile of the distribution of wages within each
level.
As in section 3.2, if seniority increases the probability of an assignment to the
high wage categories it should also increase the probability of an assignment to the high
productivity categories deflned in terms of absenteeism and misconduct. If this were
the evidence the hypothesis that the efiect of seniority on wages re°ect productivity
difierences could not be rejected.
However, table 8 shows that the evidence goes in the opposite direction. While the
marginal efiect of seniority on the probability of an assignment to the high productivity
category is negative, the analogous efiect on the probability of an assignment to the
high wage category is positive. And this happens with both the indicators based on
absenteeism and misbehaviour.
One could argue that this evidence does not exclude that more senior workers are
worth more to the flrm and therefore are paid more. But shows that this is certainly not
happening because more senior workers are less often absent or less often punished for
misbehaviour. Quite the opposite, more senior workers appears to be on average more
prone to absence and to misconduct episodes.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The possibility to replicate MA’s results twenty years later, in a difierent flrm and in
a country characterized by difierent labor market institutions is a flnding that in our
opinion reinforces MA’s original conclusion that productivity is not the driving force of
the observed upward sloping wage-seniority proflles.
However, the simple replication of their empirical analysis, based on supervisors’
evaluations as indicators of productivity, sufiers of the same weakness of their approach:
namely, that supervisors’ evaluations might not measures in a satisfactory way individual
relative productivity. A hopefully more interesting contribution of our work is to show
that MA’s results are robust to the use of alternative objective indicators of relative
productivity.
Somewhat surprisingly, in their 1981 article Medofi and Abraham claim that \hard"
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and \objective" measures of productivity do not dominate \soft" and \subjective" per-
formance ratings or rankings for two main reasons. First, because it is hard to flnd
objective measures that convincingly quantify \the true value of a worker to his or her
flrm". And second because \there would have to be only one dimension relevant for
assessing the employee’s true current worth or the researcher would have to know the
proper set of weights or shadow prices to attach to each relevant dimension." However,
in the same paper, they show that any performance indicator P which captures cur-
rent productivity, albeit with some errors should reduce the value of the coe–cient of
seniority in ln(earning) equations. \This is true even if the performance variable which
is introduced captures current productivity with error, provided only that there is some
information about productivity contained in the performance variable and that the error
in the performance variable is uncorrelated with experience and ability". Of course the
reduction of the coe–cient on seniority should be larger the smaller the error with which
the performance indicator approximates the true productivity of the worker.
We believe that indicators of absenteeism and reported misconduct episodes satisfy
precisely the requirements that a performance indicator needs in order to ofier a test
of whether the observed efiect of seniority on wages re°ects productivity difierentials.
Workers who are more often absent are evidently less productive for the flrm, whether
or not their absenteeism is motivated by shirking or true bad health. Furthermore,
inasmuch as the accumulation of flrm speciflc human capital has to take place \on the
job" absenteeism must reduce such accumulation. Similarly, for misconduct episodes,
a higher frequency and gravity of misbehaviour recorded by the personnel o–ce clearly
indicate lower productivity. These are precisely episodes in which the personnel o–ce
considers the behaviour of an employee as harmful for the flrm.
In contrast with MA’s scarce faith in the usefulness of objective indicators of pro-
ductivity, we think that a collage of evidence based on both subjective and objective
measures, ofiers more convincing arguments against the idea that the efiect of seniority
on wages re°ects the higher productivity of more serious workers.
Nevertheless, this collage of evidence is certainly not enough to completely dis-
miss with confldence the hypothesis of a productivity driven wage-seniority proflle. This
because productivity is a multidimensional concept that we do not know how to mea-
sure precisely. Suppose for example that productivity were the sum of two uncorrelated
components: knowledge and good conduct.15 Suppose also that knowledge grows with
seniority while good conduct is independent of company service. Under these assump-
tions wages could grow with seniority because of the underlying unobservable increase in
knowledge. Yet, proxies for good conduct like indicators of absenteeism and misconduct
episodes would have no efiect on the wage-seniority proflle. The evidence based on our al-
ternative measures would not mean that productivity is irrelevant for the wage-seniority
proflle. Note that the evidence based on supervisors’ evaluations is probably more robust
with respect to this problem since evaluations are likely to re°ect both knowledge and
good conduct. Given the multidimensionality and unobservability of the concept of pro-
ductivity, each proxy has advantages and disadvantages, and only a collage of difierent
indicators drawn from newer and better data can provide the flnal answer.
15We would like to thank Robert Waldmann for attracting our attention on the implications of this
hypothesis.
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A related problem in the interpretation of our flndings is represented by the fact
that there are difierent ways in which productivity may be the driving force of upward
sloping wage-seniority proflles in cross-sectional regressions. First of all, more senior
workers may be more productive because they have invested more in flrm speciflc human
capital. But, alternatively, they may be more productive simply because less productive
workers (matches) are flred (dissolved) after fewer years of company service. Since our
and MA’s evidence is based on cross sectional evidence it cannot say which of these
two possibilities is rejected. The second hypothesis has been raised in the literature af-
ter MA’s papers.16 Not surprisingly, therefore, MA interpret their evidence as evidence
against the hypothesis of flrm’s speciflc human capital investment, disregarding the sec-
ond possibility. But we believe that twenty years later this second possibility cannot be
simply disregarded.17
This is an even more relevant issue given that the alternative indicators of perfor-
mance on which this paper is based measure average individual efiort along the entire
career of a worker. Employees more prone to absenteeism or misconduct might be ex-
pected to be flred or to be induced to quit earlier in their careers. This should induce a
selection of workers in longer jobs such that seniority should appear to be associated with
a lower number of absence and misconduct episodes per year of tenure. Yet we know
from table 8 that this is not happening in our sample: higher seniority is associated with
more absence and misconduct episodes.
We think that this flnding is the consequence of the low turnover characterizing
this flrm (less than 4% per year) and in particular of the insigniflcant number of flring
or induced quits for disciplinary reasons (424 in 21 years and in a flrm with employment
levels ranging between 15000 and 19000). These numbers suggest that almost no selection
of workers has taken place in this flrm, and in particular no selection of better workers
in longer jobs. This appears to be a flrm in which most of the employment is for life
because monopolistic rents due to government regulations are large and widely shared
with workers, who therefore tend not to quit voluntarily. On the other side flring costs,
particularly those due to the unavoidability of legal con°icts in case of flring18, are
prohibitive and reduce turnover for disciplinary reasons.
Given this situation, even if in less regulated markets it were possible that upward
sloping wage-seniority proflles were due to the selection of better workers in longer jobs,
this is probably not happening in the case of this Italian flrm simply because almost
no selection takes place and jobs are for life. Therefore, the fact that our indicators of
productivity do not change the wage-seniority proflle is more likely to be evidence against
explanations in which greater productivity is a genuine driving force of this relationship.
As suggested twenty years ago by Medofi and Abraham, alternative theories in which
wages are deferred for incentive or insurance reasons are more likely to explain the
observed evidence.
16In particular, as already mentioned in the introduction, by Abraham and Farber (1987) and by
Altonji and Shakotko (1987).
17And the debate on it is still open, as shown by the recent reappraisal of Altonji and Williams (1997).
18See Ichino, Ichino and Polo (1997).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the samples used in the analysis
Means
(Standard Deviations)
Our Sample MA Sample
(N=10,817) (N=4,788)
Month/Annual wage 3,184,894 17,884
(Italian lira/dollar) (472,792) (3,240)
Highest level of education:
Less than high school 0.247 0.05
High school 0.583 0.449
Laurea/Bachelor’s degree 0.169 0.444
Master 0.049
Doctorate 0.007
Age (years) 40.7 43.1
(8.5) (10.5)
Pre-company experience (years) 5 6.8
(4.6) (6.7)
Seniority (years) 16.4 16.8
(8.3) (10.4)
Levels:
Ausiliari (Blue Collar) 0.011
Commessi (Blue Collar) 0.033
Low-Entry White Collar 0.053
High-Entry White Collar 0.202
White Collar (level 5) 0.127
White Collar (level 6) 0.238
White Collar (level 7) 0.179
Quadro 0.156
Regional dummies:
North 0.631
Centre 0.199
South 0.170
Note: The MA Sample is the Company A sample described in MA 1980. The distribution
across levels and regions is not reported by MA
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Table 2: Characteristics of the productivity measures used in the analysis
Mean
(standard deviation)
Our Sample MA Sample
(N=10,817) (N=4,788)
Supervisors’ evaluations:
1 = Worst 0.024 0.002
2 0.125 0.053
3 0.369 0.743
4 = Best 0.483 0.202
Our performance indicators:
Number of absences per year of seniority 0.42
(0.57)
Number of misconducts per year of seniority 0.01
(0.03)
= 1 if worker was never absent 0.10
(0.30)
= 1 if worker never misbehaved 0.89
(0.32)
Note: The MA sample is the Company A sample described in MA 1980. Absence episodes are
de¯ned as instances in which the employee has been away from work for health related reasons
and for more than 15 days. Misconduct episodes are de¯ned as episodes of misbehaviour
reporeted to the Personnel O±ce and punished by the latter according to what is established
by collective bargaining and by the Statuto dei Lavoratori.
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Table 3: Determinants of the Probability of Promotion; Logit estimates
MA Sample (N=2,728) Our Sample (N=10,817)
< High School 0.09 -0.60 -0.49 -0.50
(0.66) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
High School -0.39 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21
(0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Master 0.25
(0.28)
Doctorate -0.002
(0.49)
Previous exper./10 -0.71 -0.40 -0.49 -0.48
(0.32) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
(Previous exper.)2/100 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.07
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Seniority/10 -1.28 0.51 0.99 1.13
(0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
(Seniority)2/100 0.23 -0.47 -0.61 -0.65
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Evaluation = 1 or 2 (MA sample) -0.99 -1.13
Evaluation = 1 (our sample) (0.21) (0.43)
Evaluation = 3 0.93
(0.12)
Evaluation = 4 -0.14 1.30
(0.38) (0.13)
N. of absences per years of seniority /100 -0.32
(0.07)
N. of misconducts per years of seniority -3.01
(1.13)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes -3.01 -2.11 -2.29
| (0.21) (0.20) (0.19)
PseudoR2 | 0.115 0.098 0.095
Notes: the table presents the logit coe±cients, as in MA 1980, with standard errors in paren-
thesis. MA sample (Company B of MA 1980): dependent variable = 1 if promotion takes place
between July 1, 1976 and July 1, 1977; omitted dummies: College degree and evaluations =
3 and 4. Our Sample: dependent variable = 1 if promotion takes place between November 1,
1994 and December 31, 1995; omitted dummies: Laurea and evaluation = 2.
17
Table 4: Determinants of the percentage wage increases; OLS estimates
MA Sample (N=2,763) Our Sample (N=10,623)
< High School 0.12 0.72 1.04 1.05
0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
High School -0.06 -0.88 -0.70 -0.75
(0.19) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Master -0.49
(0.29)
Doctorate -0.35
(0.50)
Previous exper./10 -0.71 -0.90 -1.04 -1.01
(0.29) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63)
(Previous exper. )2/100 0.04 -0.33 -0.25 -0.26
(0.10) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Seniority/10 -1.52 -0.24 -0.43 0.22
(0.28) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
(Seniority)2/100 0.26 0.08 0.11 -0.03
(0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
ln(annual wage) at t¡ 1 -8.30 -25.27 -24.80 -23.99
(0.80) (1.11) (1.11) (1.10)
Evaluation = 1 -2.88 -2.99
(0.68) (0.75)
Evaluation = 2 -1.74
(0.16)
Evaluation = 3 1.52
(0.33)
Evaluation = 4 0.99 2.09
(0.38) (0.35)
N. of absences per year of seniority -1.36
(0.19)
N. of misconducts per year of seniority -15.35
(2.93)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes 467.10 460.88 445.56
| (19.76) (19.74) (19.56)
R2 0.147 0.068 0.065 0.063
Notes: MA sample (Company B of MA 1980): Dependent variable = Percentage wage change
beteewn 1977 and 1976; omitted dummies: College degree and evaluation = 3. Our Sample:
Percentage wage change between 1995 and 1994; omitted dummies: Laurea and evaluation =
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Earning functions; OLS estimates
Our Sample MA Sample
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6
N. obs: 10817 10817 10817 4788 4788 4788
< High School -0.18 -0.04 -0.04 -0.25 -0.08 -0.08
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.007) (0.007)
High School -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Master 0.10 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.006) (0.006)
Doctorate 0.21 0.05 0.05
(0.025) (0.016) (0.016)
Previous exper./10 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
(Previous exper.)2/100 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Seniority/10 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.09
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
(Seniority)2/100 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Evaluation = 1 -0.16 -0.05
(0.004) (0.027)
Evaluation = 2 -0.04
(0.006)
Evaluation = 3 0.022
(0.002)
Evaluation = 4 0.029 0.03
(0.002) (0.003)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 14.75 15.00 14.98 Yes Yes Yes
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) | | |
R2 0.648 0.856 0.86 0.356 0.741 0.747
Note: the dependent variable is the log of pre-tax annual earnings for both ¯rms; the omitted
dummies in our sample are: Laurea and Evaluation = 2; the omitted dummies in MA's sample
are: College degree and Evaluation = 3; the MA sample is Company A sample in MA 1980;
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Assignment to performance and wage categories; multinomial logit estimates
Model: Our Sample MA sample
N. obs: 10817 10817 4784 4784
Depvar: Performance Wage Performance Wage
Medium High Medium High Medium High Medium High
< High School 0.32 1.34 -1.51 -3.53 0.21 0.50 -2.54 -3.04
(0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.37) (0.29) (0.34)
High School -0.08 0.29 -1.89 -3.29 0.23 0.47 -0.58 -0.57
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Master or Phd 0.11 0.24 1.16 1.65
(0.35) (0.36) (0.47) (0.49)
Previous exper. -0.53 -0.80 -0.34 -0.57 -0.81 -1.32 0.44 0.83
/10 (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29)
(Previous exper.)2 0.27 0.51 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.27 -0.07 -0.08
/100 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Seniority/10 1.78 2.61 10.74 7.99 0.43 -0.12 1.12 2.90
(0.16) (0.17) (0.41) (0.45) (0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.32)
(Seniority)2/100 -0.49 -0.57 -2.67 -0.49 -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.41
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.42 1.35 -3.10 -2.42 Yes Yes Yes Yes
(0.26) (0.27) (0.34) (0.37) { { { {
PseudoR2 0.161 0.469 { {
Note: The dependent variables are the trivariate performance and wage classi¯cations. The
omitted category for both classi¯cations is the lowest one. The college degree is the omitted
education dummy. The MA's sample is the Company A sample in MA 1980; standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 7: Earning functions with alternative productivity measures; OLS estimates
Model : 1 2 3 4
N. obs: 10817 10817 10817 10817
< High School -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High School -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Previous exper./10 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
(Previous exper.)2/100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Seniority/10 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
(Seniority)2/100 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N. of absences per year of seniority -0.02 -0.01
(0.002) (0.002)
(N. of absences per year of seniority)2 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
N. of misconducts per year of seniority -0.08 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
(N. of misconducts per year of seniority)2 -0.19 -0.20
(0.08) (0.08)
Evaluation = 1 -0.01
(0.004)
Evaluation = 3 0.02
(0.002)
Evaluation = 4 0.03
(0.002)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 15.00 15.01 15.00 14.99
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.856 0.858 0.857 0.861
Note: The dependent variable is the log of pre-tax annual earnings. Omitted dummies: Laurea
and Evaluation = 2. Absence episodes are de¯ned as instances in which the employee has been
away from work for health related reasons and for more than 15 days. Misconduct episodes
are de¯ned as episodes of misbehaviour reporeted to the Personnel O±ce and punished by
the latter according to what is established by collective bargaining and by the Statuto dei
Lavoratori. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Assignment to performance and wage categories with alternative productivity
measures; Logit estimates
Model: 1 2
N. obs: 10817 10817
Misconduct Absence
Dependent variable: performance wage performance wage
< High School 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High School -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Previous exper./10 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
(Previous exper.)2/100 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Seniority/10 -0.14 0.12 -0.18 0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(Seniority)2/100 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.43 -0.07 0.03 -0.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PseudoR2 0.09 0.368 0.091 0.248
Notes: The table reports marginal e®ects with standard errors in parentheses. For misconduct
episodes: performance dependent variable = 1 if worker never misbehaved (mean = 0.89); wage
dependent variable = 1 if wage is in the high categogry (see text; mean = 0.88). For absence
episodes: performance dependent variable = 1 if worker never absent for more than 15 days
(mean = 0.10); wage dependent variable = 1 if wage is in the high category (see text; mean
= 0.09). Absence episodes are de¯ned as instances in which the employee has been away from
work for health related reasons and for more than 15 days. Misconduct episodes are de¯ned as
episodes of misbehaviour reporeted to the Personnel O±ce and punished by the latter according
to what is established by collective bargaining and by the Statuto dei Lavoratori.
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